On April 18, Hibiki Path Aoba Fund (hereinafter referred to as “HPAF”), which has a discretionary investment contract with Hibiki Path Advisors (hereinafter referred to as “we” or “Hibiki”), submitted a shareholder proposal to Tomoe Corporation (hereinafter “Tomoe” or “the Company”), one of our core portfolio companies. Subsequently, on May 26, the Company publicly disclosed the Board of Directors’ opposition to our proposal (Japanese Only). We would like to explain the background leading up to this shareholder proposal in this message.
The Company is a niche leader in the construction industry, with a particular strength in spatial structure architecture. It has a phenomenal presence in various fields such as steel towers, bridges, and steel frames. In particular, its three-dimensional “Diamond Truss” structure, developed in 1932, has created expansive, breathtaking spaces and has been widely adopted in gymnasiums, expos, and large exhibition halls. Tomoe has earned significant trust and acclaim as a pioneer of large-span, column-free architecture. The Company’s business performance has been strong: for FY3/25, it reported revenue of 34.7 bn yen (+4% YoY)1 and operating profit of 3.9 bn yen (+23.7% YoY)1. Although the Company has issued guidance for decreased revenue and profit for FY3/26, backed by its strong industry presence and technological capabilities as the widely recognized “Tomoe of the Diamond Truss”, we believe the Company will continue to deliver steady performance despite external challenges.
Although the Company boasts an excellent business, ① The Company’s management team lacks a incentive structure that would motivate them to stand on the same footing as shareholders to focus on enhancing corporate value, ② The Company’s capital policy has not been properly addressed, and the P/B ratio has remained below 1x for many years.
As for point ①, According to the FY3/24 securities report , the combined shareholding of the Company’s four Directors (excluding Audit & Supervisory Committee members and Outside Directors) amounts to approximately 200 mn yen23 in market value, only 0.4% of the Company’s market capitalization, which is extremely low to align their perspective with that of general shareholders to enhance corporate value. While President Fukazawa holds shares worth about 140 mn yen, the average holding per internal executive director (excluding President Fukazawa) is only around 19 mn yen which is nearly nothing. Furthermore, their compensation consists solely of fixed amount remuneration.
Regarding point ②: The Company holds approximately 35.4 bn yen1 in investment securities (primarily cross-shareholdings), accounting for around 30% of total assets and 50% of net assets. In addition, due to the recognition of approximately 12.1 bn yen2 in extraordinary gains associated with converting an affiliated company into a subsidiary during FY3/25, the company’s net assets have hugely increased. Given that internal reserves have accumulated excessively, while” Mid-Term Management Plan (Japanese Only)” dated May 15, 2023, sets an ROE target of 10%, the FY3/25 ROE based on NOPAT, which includes only profits derived purely from business operations, is just 3.8%14.
Moreover, P/B ratio based on book value stands at 0.8x3, while the company owns real estate unrelated to its core business (with an unrealized pre-tax profit of approximately 40 bn yen) which recorded at book value and not reflected in net assets, which further decrease P/B ratio to 0.5 adjusting the unrealized gains on real estate23. This indicates that corporate value is significantly undervalued.
In “Measures to achieve management focused on cost of capital and stock price (Japanese Only)” dated 14th November 2024, Tomoe acknowledged that its net assets have been growing faster than its share price and recognized the need to address its overcapitalized balance sheet. However, despite the Company’s recognition, no concrete actions have been taken.
In consideration of this situation and to secure the common interests of all shareholders, we have decided to submit the following two proposals.
1. Granting restricted stock compensation—up to 300 mn yen per year (maximum of 251,000 shares)—to Directors (excluding Directors who are Audit & Supervisory Committee members and Outside Directors)(Item 4)
2. Adopting a shareholder return policy that ensures a dividend on equity (DOE) of 10% or more and a progressive dividend policy(Item 5)
【Our View on the Company’s Opposition Statement】
Regarding 1,(Item 4) the Company argues that “If the proportion of equity-based compensation is designed to exceed 50% of total remuneration, it would result in an unbalanced incentive structure that excessively skewed toward stock-based incentives” However, our proposal seeks not to reduce fixed compensation, but appropriately introducing stock-based incentives in order to enhance the overall alignment between management and shareholders which ultimately resulting in a stronger commitment for Internal Executive Directors to enhance corporate value. In this regard, we are of the view that the Company’s opposition does not fully reflect the underlying intent of our proposal.
At the same time, we welcome the Company’s acknowledgment that it “takes the substance of this proposal seriously and will continue to consider an appropriate compensation plan that contributes to enhancing corporate value.” We regard this as a constructive step forward and look forward to continued dialogue on this matter.
Regarding 2,(Item 5): The Company contends that “continuing such dividend payouts may ultimately undermine long-term corporate value and the interests of all shareholders.” However, considering the Company owns real estate unrelated to its core business, which has led to an excessive accumulation of net assets, we believe that at least 10% of the DOE is essential to achieving the Company’s 10% ROE target in its medium-term plan.
The Company has also stated that it “will consider strengthening shareholder returns” and “will work to reduce cross-shareholdings at an appropriate time and in a suitable manner.” In light of these statements, until the target of ROE 10% is achieved, we will continue to advocate for a more proactive approach to shareholder returns by actively utilizing surplus cash generated by the sale of non-core assets, such as cross-shareholdings and real estate unrelated to its core business.
We hope that the Company establishes an incentive structure that enables the Company’s management to be on the same boat with shareholders and actively enhance corporate value and strengthen shareholder returns through improved capital efficiency, realizing the importance of the common interests of all shareholders. We sincerely ask for the fair judgment of those who support the fundamental enhancement of the Company’s corporate value.
1FY3/25 Company Earnings Report
2FY3/24 Annual Securities Report
3Based on the May 19 closing price of 1,324 yen
4NOPAT: 2.8 bn yen (OP of 3.9 bn yen × (1 – 30% tax rate)) / Net assets: 72.6 bn yen
Please note that the publication of these materials is not intended to solicit the acquisition or sale of any specific securities, nor should it be construed as a recommendation or as advice on investment, legal, tax, accounting, or any other matters.